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ABSTRACT 
Russia is experiencing steady population decline. One 
of the reasons for this is low fertility. The other major 
problem is insufficient housing availability. In today’s 
political discussion, these two problems are often 
presented as interconnected. The aim of our research is 
to analyse the relationship between fertility dynamics 
and provision of housing in Russia in order to 
subsequently assess the effectiveness of the most 
expensive measure for stimulating fertility in the state’s 
history – the so-called “maternity capital”. We 
estimated regression models for the time series of 
fertility rates and the availability of housing. To assess 
the strength of relationship between the time series, we 
analysed correlation between regressions’ residuals in 
two models.A retrospective analysis of the time series 
showed no correlation between the two in a historical 
context. Throughout the time that the maternity capital 
was in place the correlation analysis also revealed no 
relationship between them. Our analysis showed that 
these variables were not significantly correlated either 
in urban or rural Russian areas. We can conclude that 
the introduction of maternity capital in Russia was not 
underpinned by profound statistical and demographic 
analysis. Our results also give reason to question the 
effectiveness of maternity capital. 
INTRODUCTION 
Like most European countries, Russia is experiencing 
steady population decline. One of the reasons for this is 
low fertility. In 2015, the total fertility rate (TFR) was 
1.78, which is 15.2% below the replacement fertility 
rate (Total Fertility Rate 2016). This is of concern to 
country’s leadership, which is interested in economic 
growth and a strengthening of Russia’s demographic 
potential. 
The other major issue in our country, which has 
been around since Soviet times, is insufficient housing 
availability. For example, the average number of rooms 
shared per person in a dwelling in Russia is almost half 
that in Germany and France (Housing 2016).. In early 
1986, future USSR president Mikhail Gorbachev 
promised that by the year 2000, every family would live 
in their own flat or house. The USSR adopted a state 
programme called “Housing-2000”. However, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union derailed the 
implementation of the program. People only received 
the opportunity to become homeowners in 1991 
(Federal law 1541-I 1991); until this time, flats were 
mostly distributed free of charge through a queue-based 
system, which could last decades. 
In today’s political discussion, these two problems 
are often presented as interconnected. At the same time, 
Russian demographers see insufficient housing as just 
one of many causes of low fertility (Rotova 2012). 
According to the theory put forward by V. Borisov, 
V. Arkhangelsky, A. Antonov et al., there are two sets
of factors behind low birth rates: socio-psychological
(in other words, a low desire for children) and socio-
economic (or poor conditions for actualising the desire
for children) (Arkhangelsky 2012). The first group
includes factors like the desire to have a particular
number of children, widespread social norms regarding
the number of children and so on. The second set of
factors includes income levels, living conditions,
accessibility of kindergartens and the like. Notably, the
influence of these groups of factors is interconnected
and one cannot talk about fertility being determined
solely by economic conditions without accounting for
the desire for children. As such, an improvement in the
population’s economic conditions in and of itself will
not lead to a growth in fertility.
Existing state measures for supporting fertility in 
Russia entail every type of assistance for families 
spelled out by O. Thevenon and A. Gauthier: assistance 
to pregnant women; assistance at childbirth; assistance 
aimed at providing parents with the opportunity to 
combine childcare and paid employment; payments to 
parents who look after children (Thevenon and Gauthier 
2011). Moreover, in 2007 Russia introduced an 
unprecedented measure for stimulating fertility – the so-
called “maternity capital”. This entails a lump-sum 
payment after the birth of the second (or third and so 
on) child and can only be received once. The amount 
(around 7,750 EUR in 2017) can be spent on housing 
betterment, children’s education or on the mother’s 
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future pension. The most popular way to spend this 
payment is to improve living conditions, with some 
95% of recipients spending the money on housing 
(Maternity capital in Krasnoyarsk 2016; Statistical data 
on the expenditure of maternity capital. 2016). Notably, 
there is great variability across Russia as regards overall 
standards of living, including the per square metre cost 
of housing. Moreover, urban housing is always more 
expensive than rural residences. Yet the maternity 
capital amount is in no way modified on the basis of 
where the mother and child live, and is the same across 
the country. 
The impact of demographic policy measures on 
overall fertility and its individual determinants has been 
the subject of extensive research around the world. 
Balbo, Billari and Mills’s work presents a wide 
spectrum of topical results, where all fertility 
determinants are grouped into three levels: micro 
(determinants at the individual and/or couple level); 
meso (social relationships and social networks) and 
macro (cultural and institutional settings) (Balbo, Billari 
and Mills 2013). In Russia, sociologists chiefly study 
the desire for children among different categories of 
women, whereas research into socio-economic 
conditions for actualising these desires is far less 
prevalent (Sinitca 2012). At the same time, as Sinitsa 
notes, “Russian research contains extensive 
recommendations as regards state policy, whereas 
international studies mostly describe existing processes” 
(Sinitca 2012: 106). 
Undoubtedly, the introduction of a rather expensive 
mechanism for stimulating fertility should have been 
preceded by a profound analysis of the demographic and 
socio-economic situation across different Russian 
regions. As such, the aim of our research is to analyse 
the relationship between fertility dynamics and 
provision of housing in Russia in order to subsequently 
assess the effectiveness of the most expensive measure 
for stimulating fertility in the state’s history. 
We note that maternity capital has been used in 
Russia as a demographic policy tool for 10 years. The 
country’s leadership regularly praises its effectiveness, 
but to date, there has been no fundamental scientific 
research to support these claims. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
1. In the course of our research, we studied the time 
series for the following indicators: 
 We used the average number of square metres 
of housing per resident to describe the level of housing 
availability. This is the most accessible and commonly 
occurring indicator on people’s standards of living in 
Russian statistics. This data is publicly available from 
1980  (Living standards data 2016). 
 We used Total Fertility Rate to describe 
fertility, as it can provide an integrated representation of 
fertility intensity across different age groups. Russian 
statistics data for this is available over a much more 
extended period of time. However, for our analysis, we 
applied a comparable period and only used data from 
1980 onwards (Total Fertility Rate data 2016). 
2. To explore the correlation between the time 
series, we tried to to exclude spurious correlation. We 
estimated regression models for the stated time series 
and used ordinary least squares as the method for 
estimating the parameters of the models. In certain 
cases, we found autocorrelation of the residuals 
(AR(1)). Since we excluded an incorrect model 
specification, we removed autocorrelation by estimating 
such models on the basis of generalized least squares, 
Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure and Prais-Winsten 
correction. To assess the strength of relationship 
between the time series, we used Pearson and Spearman 
correlation. We analysed correlation between regression 
residuals in two models. 
3. To test the hypothesis about the possible influence 
of maternity capital on growing fertility, we estimated 
models and tested the relationship between the studied 
variables separately for two periods of time: 1) for the 
entire period available for analysis; 2) for the period 
since the measure was introduced (i.e. between 2007 
and now). 
4. To test the hypothesis about possibly greater 
influence of maternity capital on fertility outside large 
cities, we estimated the correlation between the studied 
variables separately in urban and rural areas. We 
considered this an important aspect of the study, 
because we supposed that the effectiveness of this 
fertility incentive measure should be greater in rural 
areas – in parts of the country where housing costs less. 
 
RESULTS 
1. A retrospective analysis of the time series 
characterizing fertility levels in the country and the 
provision of housing to the population showed no 
correlation between the two in a historical context. 
Thus, since the 1980s, the average number of square 
metres of housing per person in Russia steadily grew 




Figure 1:  Average Number of Square Metres of 















Yet over the long run, TFR moved in different 
directions. Thus, between the mid-1980s and the end of 
the century, this indicator was declining, only moving 
into a growth phase in 2000. Since then, TFR grew 
consistently (except 2005, when fertility fell) – a trend 




Figure 2:  Total Fertility Rate in Russia (Total Fertility 
Rate data 2016)  
 
Since the two trends became unidirectional in 2000, 
the subsequent modelling of the possible relationship 
between the two was done for this period. 
2. Modelling trend in the availability of housing 
between 2000 and 2015 showed that this time series is 
well approximated by a linear trend. Year-on-year, 
housing availability grew by an average of 0.34 sq.m. 
per person in the country (tables 1-3). 
 
Table 1: Model Summary 
(dependent variable: model 1 – average number of sq.m. 




















































1 0.995 0.995 0.1190 1.502 
2 0.885 0.877 0.0358 1.565 
 
 
Table 2: ANOVA  
(dependent variable: model 1 – average number of sq.m. 



































Regression 39.41 1 39.41 2781.95 0.000 
Residual 0.19 14 0.01   
Total 39.60 15    
2 
Regression 0.14 1 0.14 107.58 0.000 
Residual 0.02 14 0.00   
Total 0.15 15    
Table 3: Coefficients  
(dependent variable: model 1 – average number of sq.m. 




Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error 
1 
Constant -661.754 12.958 -51.071 0.000 







3.812 -10.180 0.000 
Years 0.041 0.004 10.372 0.000 
 
Upon modelling trend in the fertility between 2000 
and 2015, we identified an autocorrelation of residuals 
in the initial model. An estimation on the basis of GLS, 
Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure and Prais-Winsten 
correction enabled us to identify an increasing linear 
trend in TFR dynamics with an average annual increase 
of 0.041 (tables 1-3).  
3. Correlation analysis of regressions’ residuals 
showed that fertility and housing availability in the 
examined period were not correlated (table 4). 
 
Table 4: Correlations between TFR and housing 
availability (from 2000 to 2015) 
 
Indicator Value 
Pearson Correlation 0.366 
Sig. (2-tailed) Pearson Correlation 0.164 
Spearman's rho 0.279 
Sig. (2-tailed) Spearman's rho 0.295 
 
4. Throughout the time that the maternity capital 
fertility stimulation programme was in place (2007 to 
2015), the studied indicators grew. Yet the availability 
of housing in this period grew by 14%, whereas birth 
rates grew much more – by 25.5%. 
5. Modelling the trends over the stated period and 
examining the correlations revealed no relationship 
between the availability of housing and fertility rates 
since the introduction of the maternity capital 
programme (table 5). 
 
Table 5: Correlations between TFR and housing 
availability (from 2007 to 2015) 
 
Indicator Value 
Pearson Correlation -0.014 
Sig. (2-tailed) Pearson Correlation 0.972 
Spearman's rho 0.017 
Sig. (2-tailed) Spearman's rho 0.966 
 
An analysis with account of a possible lag in 
changes to fertility in response to improved housing 





















connection between the evaluated variables either. 
Analogous analysis with account of a possible lag 
between improved housing conditions in response to 
greater fertility (as envisaged by the maternity capital 
programme) also did not reveal any correlation. 
6. An analysis of the dynamics of the studied 
variables by territory showed that throughout the time 
that the maternity capital programme has been 
operating, rural indicators have been higher than urban 
ones. Thus, housing availability in rural areas each year 
was on average 7.6% greater than in cities; TFR in rural 
areas was on average 39.6% higher each year than in 
urban ones. 
On the whole, between 2007 and 2015, housing 
availability grew both in cities and in non-urban areas. 
The difference in growth proved insignificant (13.7% 
and 14%). Yet the difference in fertility growth was 
marked (29.7% in cities and 17.4% in rural areas). 
7. Modelling trends separately for cities and rural 
areas showed that the evaluated time series throughout 
the time of the maternity capital programme is well 
approximated by linear trends. Correlation analysis of 
regressions’residuals showed that birth rates and 
housing availability in the examined period were not 
significantly correlated either in urban or rural areas 
(table 6). Correlation analysis with lag effects also did 
not uncover any relationship. 
 
Table 6: Correlations between TFR and housing 







Pearson Correlation 0.500 -0.069 




Spearman's rho 0.383 -0.083 






The lack of correlation between the dynamics of birth 
rates and housing availability in Russia gives reason to 
question the effectiveness of maternity capital, the most 
expensive state-funded fertility stimulation programme 
in the country’s history. Our results give rise to a 
number of discussion points. 
First of all, we believe there are two main reasons 
for the registered growth of TFR in Russia in recent 
years: 
1. The introduction of maternity capital could 
have had a certain effect on the total number of births 
per woman and the timing of childbearing. Thus, 
women who had unstable reproductive plans in 2007 
may have been prompted to have a child after this 
programme was implemented (the so-called 
postponement of childbearing effect). Moreover, one 
could suppose that some people (particularly rural 
dwellers) misunderstood information about the rollout 
of maternity capital, believing that they could spend the 
money as soon as their second child was born, in 
whatever way they saw fit; 
2 A certain positive effect could be the result of 
the relatively successful development of the Russian 
economy between 2007 and 2015. In this period, per 
capita GDP grew 1.45 times, according to IMF data 
(Gross domestic product 2016). Despite the observation 
made by, for example, Sobotka et al, that the 
relationship between TFR and GDP is contradictory 
(Sobotka, Skirbekk and Philipov 2011), there is research 
that clearly registers a positive correlation between 
these indicators. Thus, Martin identified this connection 
for Australia (Martin 2004), Santow and Brachner – for 
Sweden (Santow and Bracher 2001), and so on. 
In our view, it is important to note that the growth in 
TFR happened against a background of a negative 
influence of structural factors on total births in Russia. 
Indeed, in this period, there was a significant decline in 
the proportion of women of fertile age in the total 
female population. Thus in 2002 it was 43.6%, 
compared to 39.4% in 2015. The number of women of 
this age declined by 2.9 million people during this 
period. 
We would also note that despite the growth in TFR, 
its value during the studied period was below the 
replacement fertility rate (2.1). Moreover, the total 
effectiveness of maternity capital measure would have 
to lead TFR to increase by at least 1.0 (if one is to 
imagine that women of fertile age would, upon learning 
of this unprecedented support, choose to use it 
immediately). However, official Russian statistics for 
2007-2008 registered a growth in TFR of just 0.086. 
This shows that in 2008, only every 12th woman gave 
birth to one child more than in the previous year 
(moreover, it is unclear whether that decision was the 
result of the introduction of maternity capital). 
If one is to accept the hypothesis that maternity 
capital and the potential improvement in living 
conditions it promises influences the average number of 
births for a Russian woman, its impact should be greater 
for rural areas, where living standards and living costs 
are lower. Statistical data disprove this hypothesis. 
When it comes both absolute and relative values, the 
growth in TFR was greater for women from cities. 
It is also clear that before the introduction of such a 
costly fertility stimulation programme, no retrospective 
analysis of relationships between fertility levels and 
housing availability was carried out. Our data show that 
there is no positive correlation between these indicators. 
This is supported by research by other Russian 
scientists. For example, Maleva and Sinyavskaya 
estimated the probability of childbirth depending on 
various socio-economic indicators between 2001 and 
2004 (Maleva and Sinyavskaya 2007). They registered 
that for women who already have children, the decision 
to have another child was in no way connected to living 
conditions . These researchers note that “ceteris paribus, 
housing availability statistically significantly increases 
 
 
the likelihood of childbearing in the model of all 
completed births, and with respect to the model for first 
children most of all. However, it proves insignificant for 
the birth of the second and subsequent child” (Maleva 
and Sinyavskaya 2007: 183). As such, it can be asserted 
that from the outset, maternity capital was not able to 
influence the very category of women at whom it was 
aimed (women who have one child and are potentially 
ready to have another). 
Moreover, we consider the content of this 
programme to be rather ill-thought through for reasons 
that include: 
1) strong variability across Russia as regards 
standard of living with the same maternity capital 
amount for different regions. This leads to varying 
perceptions about the impact of this measure for 
different groups of the population. As such, the very 
mechanism was initially aimed at stimulating fertility in 
the most economically laggard parts of Russia;  
2) such significant amounts (in 2016 alone, Russia 
spent RUB 304.3 billion (Federal law 364-FZ 2015) or 
EUR 4.77 billion on maternity capital) are allocated 
solely for the birth of a child, rather than for supporting 
his subsequent upbringing and development. Thus, we 
believe that people are presented with a certain 
“message” that the state cares most about the quantity 
and not the ‘quality’ of children. We note that there are 
many international examples of a more balanced 
demographic policy. For example, in France, child 
benefits are paid from the second child onwards, until 
the child turns 20 and the amount grows with the 
number of children and their age (Köppen 2006). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
A study of cause-and-effect relationships between 
variables presented as time series is one of the 
difficulties of econometric modelling. This could 
explain the deficit of Russian demographic research that 
uses such instruments. At the same time, econometric 
modelling has high heuristic potential and could become 
the basis for developing more effective demographic 
policy measures. Firstly, such modelling enables 
justifying the expedience of a particular demographic 
policy measure (by studying the potential relationship 
between variables that are expected to be affected by its 
introduction). Secondly, the use of econometric methods 
allows adjusting the substance of the developed 
measures. 
On the basis of the results we obtained, we can 
suppose that the introduction of maternity capital in 
Russia as a state measure for stimulating fertility was 
not underpinned by profound statistical and 
demographic analysis. Thus, we believe that there were 
insufficient grounds to tie the introduced demographic 
measures solely with changes to the provision of 
housing. Moreover, the differentiation of Russian 
regions was not taken into consideration, which fully 
negated the possible impact of introducing the maternity 
capital programme. For example, our earlier research 
showed that countries with a large number of 
constituent parts with high variance in their 
development require a demographic policy that is 
differentiated by type of region (Shubat et al 2016). 
Such development of targeted measures for different 
types of regions would improve the effectiveness of 
Russia’s overall demographic policy. On the whole we 
note that such a strong emphasis on one economic 
measure for stimulating fertility without creating 
conditions to drive greater desire for children among the 
Russian population could not, from the outset, lead to 
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